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Abstract 
 
Countries characterized by strong workers’ political rights tend to exhibit a strong and concentrated 
corporate ownership structure. One explanation is that employees' political rights influence 
corporate governance: systems characterised by strong employees' rights tend to be balanced by 
strong and concentrated owners. In this approach, the separation between ownership and control is 
only possible when unions and social democratic parties are sufficiently weak. In this paper we argue 
that causation runs also in the opposite direction (from strong concentrated ownership to strong 
employees' protection) and leads to multiple equilibria characterized by alternative interaction paths 
of Politics and Corporate Governance. To empirically assess our theoretical arguments, we run 
Bayesian simultaneous equation estimation and perform Bayesian model comparison of the various 
theories for employment protection determination. We obtain that the concentration model is more 
likely than other models in the determination of employment protection. We conclude by exploring 
economic policy implications. 
Keywords: employment protection, corporate governance, ownership concentration, Bayesian model 
estimation, Bayesian model comparison. 
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1. Introduction 
Similarly to the earlier successes of Japan and Germany, the recent success of the American 
economy and the revival of the British economy have attracted the attention of many 
economists and policy makers1. The legal origin approach has emphasized how the recent 
success may have very old roots in the different common law and civil law traditions, which, 
well before the advent of capitalism, characterized these countries. Under common law 
systems, private owners, including the minority shareholders of contemporary large firms, 
could be better protected. Other approaches have emphasized how the non-proportional 
electoral systems, prevailing in the Anglo-American world, favors political coalitions which 
are more friendly to shareholders.  
Since a long time, “American exceptionalism” has been a puzzle for social scientists 
but the nature of the problem has somehow changed. Becht and De Long (2005) have 
observed how a century ago academics like Werner Sombart worried why the United States 
was exceptional in that it did not have socialism, while today academics worry about a 
different form of American exceptionalism: the negligible role of block holding in the United 
States. 
Mark Roe has linked together these two different pieces of the American puzzle 
observing that, in modern capitalist economies there is a causal relation running from social 
democracy to corporate governance. According to Roe (2003) the higher the degree of social 
democracy (and, in particular, the strength of employees’ rights) the stronger the 
employers' tendency to organize in concentrated forms of corporate ownership with one or 
few major block holders. Figure 1 plots residuals obtained from the regression of the labour 
protection index and of the ownership concentration index over GDP per capita for 21 
OECD countries2. As it is apparent from the fitted regression line, there is a significant 
positive cross-country correlation between the degree of protection of workers’ rights and 
the degree of corporate ownership concentration (once considered the cross-country 
differences in GDP per capita). According to this figure, American exceptionalism can be 
seen as an extreme case of a general relation linking together employees job protection to 
the degree of separation between ownership and control (see Belloc and Pagano, 2005). This 
evidence is also confirmed if we extend the sample considered to include 47 countries 
(Figure 2)3. To explain the positive relation between protection   
 
 
                                                 
1 Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) have even seen the convergence to the Anglo-American model as the “end of 
history of corporate governance”. Other authors (see, for instance, Morck et al., 2005, and James, 2006) have 
argued that a variety of arrangements exists in modern capitalist economies and family groups are the prevailing 
form of organization in some countries. Bebchuk and Roe (2004) have emphasized the path-dependent nature of 
corporate governance. 
2 See paragraph 3.3 for a more detailed variables’ description (data source for the labour protection index is 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2001; GDP per capita in 2000 is from World Bank, 2004; ownership concentration index 
is from La Porta et al., 2006). 
3 Data source for the labour protection index (which includes protection of labour and employment laws plus 
protection of collective relations laws) is Botero et al. (2004). 
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Figure 1. Partial regression plot of labour protection index and ownership concentration 
(21 OECD countries). Coef. =  1.0577 (p-value = 0.007).  
 
of workers’ rights and corporate ownership concentration, Roe (2003) suggests a causality 
relation that runs from employees' political rights to corporate governance forms. In Roe’s 
approach, the separation of ownership and control is not due to “better” corporate laws, 
stemming from different legal origins (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999), nor to different electoral 
processes, leading to a better protection of minority shareholders (Pagano and Volpin, 
2005). It is rather inversely proportional to the degree of “social democratic” political 
pressure and, in particular, to forms of job protection. When this pressure is present, strong 
and active owners are necessary to limit managers' tendency to collude with employees. In 
this case, by resisting this pressure, big block holders would provide a public service also for 
the small share holders. 
In this paper we extend Roe’s approach by integrating it with the opposite direction of 
causation running from ownership concentration and business organization to employees 
rights and stronger job protection. When there is no separation between ownership and 
control, employees are more likely to seek protection from the interference of the dominant 
block holders and their social circle, including their relatives and friends, who may otherwise 
monopolize the best jobs of the company. Thus, while employees' rights may prevent the 
separation between ownership and control, conversely the existence of powerful block 
holders may favour some sort of “social democratic reaction” and, in particular, a high 
degree of unions' activity. This two-way relationship entails multiple co-evolution paths 
between 
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Figure 2. Partial regression plot of labour protection index and ownership concentration 
(47 countries). Coef. =  0.5916 (p-value = 0.006). 
 
ownership concentration and workers’ organization: a certain degree of centralization of the 
interests of one side may easily induce a corresponding concentration of the interests of the 
other side. The previous literature has already been devoted to explore the determinants of 
workers’ rights protection and of ownership concentration. As already mentioned, a 
considerable part of it advocates the role of laws. Botero et al. (2004) implement a 
comparative study of the various models that try to explain the regulation of labour. The 
authors compare three broad theories: (i) the efficiency theory (North, 1981; Demsetz, 1967) 
maintains that governments select labour market interventions to cure market failures so to 
maximize social welfare; accordingly richer countries are expected to regulate less as they 
have fewer market failures to heal; (ii) the political power theory (Olson, 1965, 1993) argues 
that institutions transfer resources to individuals that are endowed with political power; 
accordingly workers rights are expected to be protected by stricter regulation when the 
government has a leftist orientation; (iii) finally, the legal theory (La Porta et al., 1998, 
1999; Djankov et al., 2003) sustains that institutions are shaped by the legal tradition that 
characterizes the various countries: Common law economies are expected to regulate the 
least, and French law countries the most. While the authors find empirical support to the 
latter two theories (but not to the former), they also discover that the estimated impact of 
legal origins on labour regulations is larger than that of politics.  
On the other side, La Porta et al. (1999) analyze the role of legal traditions in 
explaining cross-country variation in ownership concentration. Starting from a sample of 27 
wealthy economies, the authors classify them in two groups with respectively high and low 
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degree of shareholders’ protection. They observe that widely held firms are more common in 
the former group of countries, while family-controlled and state-controlled firms are more 
numerous in the latter. Moreover, the first subsample is dominated by British law 
economies, whereas the second one by French law countries. La Porta et al. (2006) further 
investigate the determinants of stock market development in 49 economies focusing this 
time on securities laws. The authors argue that “laws matter” by improving market 
discipline. In particular, they show that laws imposing mandatory disclosure of relevant 
information and those specifying liability standards have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on stock market development.  
Legal theories compete with political power theories. Pagano and Volpin (2005) 
evaluate the simultaneous determination of shareholder and employment protection, 
stressing the role played by the proportionality of the voting system. The simultaneous 
equations model estimation for a sample of 21 countries suggests that the proportionality of 
the voting system exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on shareholder 
protection, while has a positive (but not always significant) impact on employment 
protection legislation. Panel data analysis (which however does not considers simultaneous 
determination of the two dependent variables) confirms these conclusions and also 
corroborates the important role played by legal origins in the determination of the two 
variables.  
Finally, Roe (2003) presents overwhelming evidence that countries characterized by 
stronger job protection and employees' political rights (stronger “social democracy”) tend to 
have more concentrated corporate ownership forms. The causality relation is, however, not 
tested by the author. In a similar vein,  Mueller and Philippon (2006) maintain that 
(family) concentrated ownership is relatively more common in countries where labour 
relations are hostile, while dispersed ownership is prevalent in countries characterized by 
cooperative labour relations. They also offer coherent empirical evidence using survey-based 
measures of the quality of labour relations and ownership structures data for 30 countries. 
 In this paper we try to show that our Politics-Business Co-evolution hypothesis 
explains better than other theories the variety of business and workers organizations that 
characterizes modern capitalist economies.  In the next section, we consider in detail the 
theoretical and historical argument which support our hypothesis while in section 3 we 
adopt Bayesian estimation and Bayesian model comparison to show that our approach 
offers an explanation that is more likely than those existing in the literature. Finally, in the 
last section, we consider the policy implications of our analysis.   
 
2.  Dispersed and concentrated interaction paths. 
In his book “Strong Managers, Weak Owners” Mark Roe (1994, p. 4) observed how, in 
spite of all the shortcomings which are today in the spotlight, the separation of ownership 
and control allowed skilled managers to run the firm and separates unskilled descendants 
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from control of the firm they could not run well. In a similar vein, Chandler (1990) 
contrasted American and German managerial firms with British family firms at the time of 
the second industrial revolution, and argued that family control was the cause of the poor 
performance of England.   
Managerial hierarchies do not simply imply the usual problem that interests of the 
managers should be made consistent with those of the shareholders but also a broader and, 
somehow, opposite problem: that the “family allocation of control” does not interfere with 
the internal meritocracy of the firm and the incentives for good managerial performance.  In 
spite of the well-known agency problems, the separation between ownership and control had 
positive effects because it increased the role of competence allocation rules over that of 
family connection rules.   
The US were ideally suited to develop the meritocratic institutions necessary to the 
working of managerial hierarchies. They lacked the sense of class divisions that underlined 
the dynastic assignment of many jobs in Europe. The weakness of American “social 
democracy” was somehow related to the widespread feeling that class extraction was not an 
insurmountable barrier for the achievement of economic power and, consequently, there was 
no strong need to organize unions and other institutions which could tame the economic 
power of established capitalist dynasties. The US were typically characterised by politicians, 
who acted on the basis of the belief that a full-blown democracy (as well as their own 
“democratic power”) was incompatible with a concentration of economic power. In this 
respect, a single cultural and political tradition linked together Jefferson's vision of a 
democracy based on small land owners, Jackson's confrontation with the power of the Bank 
of America and Lincon's successful war against the slave owning aristocracy of the South 
(Hofstadter, 1967). At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century the US 
was the only country (maybe together with Switzerland4) where the landed aristocracy had 
no important cultural and political role in social life. Thanks to their anti-aristocratic 
attitude, the US had an early reaction to the concentration of economic power, which came 
with the second industrial revolution. The Sherman act (1890) was the first and, by far, the 
most important piece of anti-monopoly legislation to be enacted in a modern economy. After 
                                                 
4 There are remarkable similarities between US and Switzerland historical backgrounds. Both countries are 
somehow geographically protected by foreign powers, respectively by the Oceans and the Mountains, and 
internally geographically divided by long distances (the US) and by the high altitudes of the Alpes (Switzerland) 
- a geography that has favoured decentralized federalist arrangements in the two countries. Both countries came 
to an early tolerance of religious and ethnic diversity and the “cement of society” relied more on shared values 
and ways of life than on ethnic or religious homogeneity. Also Switzerland achieved an early exit from feudal 
relations. Swiss feudal ties were traditionally weak. The peasants were difficult to dominate because they were 
often far away on the Alpine pastures and because they were well trained in military activities (serving, often, as 
the most valuable mercenaries all around Europe). After the defeat of the Sonderbund alliance, formed in 1847 
by the conservative and Catholic Cantons, the “Swiss Confederation or, more accurately, some twenty-three 
leading figures in it, drafted a document so suited to the conditions that the Switzerland of 1849 and of 1847 
seem to belong to different eras (Steinberg 1996, p. 47).  Similarly to the US (where the secession war 
terminated the political influence of the slave-owning landed aristocracy of the South) Swiss big business had 
“democratic origins” in the sense that a full blown post-feudal society had already emerged before the second 
industrial revolution. 
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Theodore Roosevelt's confrontations with big business, Wilson continued to try to set limits 
to the power of the major block holders. During his presidency, the Clayton act (1914) ruled 
that the ownership of substantial stakes in different firms could induce self-dealing and 
unfair competition and should involve the action of anti-trust authorities. F.D. Roosevelt 
completed these policies by using taxation to dismantle the pyramids (Randall, 2004) that, 
in many cases, had allowed few “economic royalists” to use “other people’s money” to 
impose a “new industrial dictatorship” (Roosevelt quoted by Roe, 1994, p. 40). While the 
American absence of social-democratic job protection, allowed a radical diversification of 
asset ownership and a transfer of power from owners to managers, also the reverse was 
happening: social democratic job protection became weaker because early restrictions were 
imposed on block holders and made it more difficult to gain private benefits from partial, 
but substantial, ownership. Early democratic policies induced dispersed forms of ownership 
and a separation between ownership and control. This “exceptional” early dispersion of 
capitalist interests made it less important to concentrate workers’ interests in strong unions 
and in social democratic parties. The two sides of American “exceptionalism” reinforced 
each other: there was little socialism because block holding was inhibited and there was 
little block holding because a socialist movement of European dimension and radicalism did 
not develop. 
The two-way causation between politics and business is also evident in those countries 
where there were relevant class barriers and dynastic policies played an explicit role in both 
the political and economic sphere. This typology included England, where the landed 
aristocracy had transformed itself into an entrepreneurial class and led a revolution against 
the powers of the crown. It comprised also cases, such as France, where the aristocracy had 
resisted revolutionary forces with alternative fortunes or, even more problematic cases like 
Germany, where the emerging bourgeoisie could acquire legitimacy only by imitating the 
customs and the dynastic ambitions of the Junkers (see Moore, 1973). In these economies, 
owing family dynasties exercised a power upsetting the values of managerial meritocracy 
(Morck, 2005 and 2006).  Wealth, family connections, proper accents, social skills and even 
appropriate table manners interfered with an assignment of jobs based on effort and 
competence. In these circumstances, social-democratic movements could easily emerge as 
spontaneous reactions to the privileges of the ruling dynasties and be reinforced by the 
widespread feeling that the “have-nots” had to be defended against the exercise, and often 
against the abuse, of economic power. Faced with the concentration the power of the 
wealthy, “social democracy” could only limit and, sometimes, challenge its exercise by 
organizing a countervailing power. While “social democracy” could scare owners and make 
it impossible the separation of ownership and control, the identification of ownership and 
control created the conditions for all sorts of “social-democratic” reactions, including 
unionization and development of job protection. 
Dispersed ownership and low degree of “social democracy” can be seen as institutional 
complements. Similarly, concentrated ownership and high degree of “social democracy”, can 
also be seen as institutional complements. One way of explaining these relations of 
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complementarity is in terms of reciprocal disarmament and armament5. Each group can 
achieve a higher capacity of exercising power by concentrating dispersed interests in 
centralized agents which can better solve free-riding problems (Olson, 1965). Like in an 
arms race game, all level of armaments can potentially be equilibria and define different 
countervailing balances of power (see Pagano and Belloc, 2005). For instance, the balance of 
power can stay the same if both owners and workers stay dispersed or if both are 
concentrated defining the two following possible extreme equilibria, which approximate the 
US and the countries clustered at the south-west corner of Figure 1 and Figure 2. The self-
reinforcing interactions between dispersed ownership and labour interests generate a 
dispersed equilibrium and, similarly, the self-reinforcing interactions between concentrated 
ownership and centrally organized workers' interests generate a concentrated equilibrium.  
In the extreme as well as the intermediate cases, the incentive to concentrate interests 
of one side increases with the concentration of interests of the other side or, in other words, 
the (dis)armament of one party favours the dis(armament) of the other. However, there are 
limits to this symmetric representation of the concentration and dispersion of owners' and 
workers' interests.   The ownership of capital can be concentrated, by the means of ordinary 
market transactions, in the hands of few owners and there will be a spontaneous tendency 
to do so whenever it increases profits. By contrast, because of non-slavery and self-
ownership, the property of labour is necessarily dispersed and the concentration of labour 
cannot be achieved by the means of standard economic contracts. In this case, politics can 
be used to stop the concentration of capital or to further the concentration of labour 
interests in trade unions.  
Since market forces tend to concentrate capital and to disperse labour, in absence of 
an early and strong policy, a concentrated equilibrium is likely to arise: the “political” 
organization and concentration of workers' interests follows the spontaneous “economic” 
concentration of capitalist ownership. When politics is anticipated by spontaneous capitalist 
concentration, it reacts to it by favouring a comparable concentration of interests on the 
workers’ side. Some degree of social democracy or other arrangements restoring the balance 
of power between the two parties is then likely to arise in a democratic society.  
The historical conditions under which a dispersed equilibrium is likely to arise are 
rather special and, perhaps, they were approximated only by the US. When the need for 
large scale companies came about, no other country (with the possible exception of 
Switzerland) had so many citizens who had come from a massive and, sometimes, conscious 
exit from dynastic feudal relations. Many of them had been in search of religious freedom. 
Moreover, by revolting against the British colonial rule, their ancestors had also broken 
with the deference to established family dynasties. Only in America such a strong ideology 
against “economic royalists” and “industrial dictatorship” (Roosevelt quoted by Roe, 1994, 
p. 40) pre-existed the age of large scale capitalist firms. Some key elements of this ideology 
were the distaste for the type of concentrated dynastic interests characterising the old 
                                                 
5 See also Topkins (1998), and Milgrom and Roberts (1994). 
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continent. Social respect moved from people born wealthy to “self-made” individuals. Thus, 
the meritocratic climbing of a corporate managerial ladder was far more compatible with 
American ideology than the deferential respect for the concentrated power of the capitalist 
dynasties. Managers did not need to plot against concentrated owners. They were the 
unintended beneficiaries of a political struggle against concentrated interests (Roe, 1994). 
The public company ruled by managers was itself the unintended outcome of this struggle 
and prevailed because its internal promotion system fitted better the American political 
conditions and, more generally, the American way of life than dynastic succession. The very 
special conditions of American history allowed American politics to anticipate the 
concentration of the owners' interests in the way predicted by our politics-business co-
evolution hypotesis: in a case, approximated by a dispersed equilibrium, causation was 
initially moving from politics to forms of business organization. 
The historical conditions necessary for a concentrated equilibrium are quite common. 
In many other countries, some form of concentration of ownership interests went together 
with the growth of large-scale enterprises, and family dynasties were usually involved in the 
management of firms and in the appointment of managers. In many cases, financial 
institutions made the exercise of this power compatible with the needs of large-scale 
enterprises by putting in the hands of the “economic royalists” the availability of “other 
people’s money”. The limited diversification of risks and the poor incentives for professional 
managers were (partially) compensated by the capture of many important management jobs 
by the ruling families and by a decrease of the agency problems arising from the separation 
between ownership and control. The inability of politics to anticipate the “armament of 
capitalism” induced later a political reaction to arm labour by concentrating and organising 
its interests. Since, in most countries, politics could not limit the concentration of the 
ownership interests, the resulting model of corporate governance caused a “social 
democratic” political reaction. Thus, in most European countries the direction of causation 
is consistent with the general prediction concerning the achievement of concentrated 
equilibria: politics reacted only lately to a model of corporate governance serving the 
concentrated interests of capitalist dynasties. 
Since each type of institutional equilibrium (concentrated or dispersed) tends to show 
a remarkable degree of stability, the “political origins” of corporate governance - that is the 
political conditions existing when big capitalist firms first emerged - are quite important 
and, in many cases, they have even shaped in an irreversible way the co-evolution paths 
between politics and corporate governance. However, in some cases, some economic and 
political processes have moved the economy from one co-evolution path to the other and, 
during the transition, the organization of corporate governance and labour market 
institutions were mismatched.  
The UK is a particularly interesting case because it has gone through a long period of 
institutional mismatch. It has gone through a difficult transition from a politics-business co-
evolution path based on well-established family dynasties and well-organized trade-unions to 
a model of “popular capitalism” based on dispersed ownership and weaker unions. In the 
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UK an open aristocracy led the revolt against the King and mutated into an entrepreneurial 
class. Some form of aristocratic family capitalism had an important role in the first, and 
mainly British, industrial revolution and preserved its dynastic power at the time of the 
second industrial revolution. However, at that time, according to Chandler (1990), this 
typology of capitalism was outdated. The new industries, which developed in the second half 
of the nineteenth century required some form of managerial capitalism. According to him, 
this explains the relative decadence of British Capitalism at the time of the second 
industrial revolution.  
Early unionization and a deep sense of class division made Britain a case close to the 
case of concentrated equilibrium.  However, some forces would slowly produce a substantial 
mutation in the characteristics of British capitalism. Transmission and division of 
inheritance, coupled with the international role of the city, produced a dispersion of 
property. For some time, the fragmentation of firms' ownership did not involve a 
comparable loss of centralized control, which remained entrenched in the usual social and 
family circles. Indeed, in the seventies the UK was characterized by a situation of 
“institutional disequilibrium” where the traditionally well-organized British unions were not 
matched by a countervailing centralization of firms' ownership. This period coincided with a 
crisis of the British economy - which, for some times, seemed to lead to “continental 
solutions” such as pyramids and cross-share holding on one side and some “responsible” 
centralization of union's activity on the other (Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2005). These 
“continental solutions” were, however, opposed by the city. Eventually the Thatcher 
government made a sharp move towards a dispersed type of institutional equilibrium 
characterised by strong limitations of unions' activities and by a (much advertised) 
shareholder popular capitalism. These arrangements have not been substantially reversed by 
the subsequent Labour Party governments. 
The UK transition shows how the “political origins” of a certain country have a long-
lasting but not a definitive influence on the characteristics of its economic system. They can 
be eventually reversed by some combination of spontaneous economic processes and of 
conscious government's policies. One cannot only rely on the alleged permanent effects of 
“exogenous” origins and should really focus on the multiple paths of interaction between 
politics and business. Some co-evolution paths may be upset by sudden shocks and by slow 
cumulative changes. For limited periods of their histories, some countries may experience 
painful transitions from one path to another and be out of any sort of “institutional 
equilibrium”. However, if, in the long run, these co-evolution paths work as “institutional 
attractors”, for a sufficient large number of countries, relations such as considered in Figure 
1 should fit. In this sense, our co-evolution hypothesis is intended to explain the 
characteristics of alternative systems of corporate governance.  
In the next section, we will concentrate on the quantitative analysis of our politics-
business co-evolution paths. However, we will mention immediately some qualitative 
historical evidence, which, in our view, makes our hypothesis preferable to alternative 
explanations. In particular we wish to argue that, in spite of the limitations of (perhaps all) 
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origins-type explanations, the political origins of big business explain the various models of 
corporate governance better than legal origins.  
According to legal origins, “common law systems” explain the emergence of public 
companies. This theory puts under the same umbrella the US and the UK- an explanation 
that does not fit with the fact that the UK had “continental features” and it could easily 
ended up being completely “continental”. British institutions have moved closer to the US 
only thanks to the (relatively recent) strong policies of Margaret Thatcher. 
Moreover, the Politics-Business Equilibria hypothesis is consistent with the case of 
Switzerland, which poses a rather difficult puzzle for the legal origins story. In terms of legal 
systems Switzerland is clearly part of the continental traditions and it is difficult to 
attribute the dispersed nature of ownership of its large firms to different legal origins. By 
contrast, Switzerland fits very well our Politics-Business co-evolution hypothesis. 
Switzerland is the only European country that, by the time of the second industrial 
revolution where, similarly to the US, the political role of the landed aristocracy had 
vanished and which (again similarly to the US) was characterised by an early democratic 
federal political system with little sense of continental class divisions. Well before England, 
most Swiss Cantons could realize the political conditions for a “dispersed equilibrium” and 
fit the south-west corner of Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
A similar “historical” objection could be raised with reference to theories that link 
corporate governance with political electoral systems. With the same electoral system, 
Britain moved from family capitalism to more managerial forms of corporate governance 
and, with some complicated, often proportional, electoral rules, Switzerland had a co-
evolution path relatively close to the US. 
While we have exposed this qualitative evidence in favour of our hypothesis, we are 
well aware of the fact that each model and each explanation can have its exceptions and 
shortcomings. One cannot rely only on arguments which focus on “case studies” concerning 
particular historical paths. For this reason, in the next section we will consider a numerous 
sample of countries and we will try to argue that our politics-business interaction 
hypothesis, relatively to other explanations, has better chances to explain the different 
forms of corporate governance and of labour protection. 
 
3. Comparing models: a Bayesian approach 
3.1 Motivation 
In this section, we carry out an econometric analysis to gauge the two-way relationship 
between corporate governance forms (Business) and degree of workers’ rights protection 
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(Politics), using a cross-section of 47 economies6. We adopt a Bayesian perspective in 
estimation and model comparison. We believe this is the relevant methodology in our 
context for the following reasons. First, as mentioned in the introduction, several recent 
studies have offered data evidence on alternative explanations for employment protection, 
on the one side (Botero et al. 2004; Pagano and Volpin, 2005), and for corporate 
governance, on the other (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2006; 
Mueller and Philippon, 2006;  Roe, 2003). It follows that, if we purport to study the (co-
)determination of employment protection and ownership concentration without resorting to 
an arbitrary variable selection procedure, we need to control for a long list of regressors. 
Thus, when an unquestioned structural theoretical model is not available (as in our case), 
model uncertainty is crucial. What is relevant in this context is investigating the relative 
importance of one model relatively to another considering all the models that cannot be 
rejected by the data. The Bayesian methodology allows to explicitly take into account 
model uncertainty when implementing model comparisons. Second, we choose Bayesian 
econometrics because of small sample data limitations. As it is frequent in cross-country 
analyses, our sample is small (47 data points). In the presence of few observations, empirical 
distributions do not proxy limiting distributions. Furthermore, as shown by James and 
Stein (1960) and Efron and Morris (1971, 1972) when the number of parameters is large 
with respect to the number of observations, Bayesian approaches are superior in terms of 
parameter estimates to frequentist approaches (Gelman and Rubin, 1995). If prior 
information on the parameters of interest is available, it can then be used to select the list 
of regressors to include into the model, and to assign prior distributions to the 
corresponding parameters that represent basis for inference.  
We therefore consider a simultaneous two-equation model for labour protection-and-
ownership concentration determination taking into account the various theories proposed by 
the previous literature (legal, political, and efficiency theories) as well as our Politics-
Business interaction argument. The full model is estimated employing Bayesian estimation 
and, finally, the various theories are compared by Bayesian nested and non-nested model 
comparison. Before presenting the model and the data (subsection 3.3), in the following 
subsection we briefly review the econometric approach adopted (for a more detailed 
textbook treatment see, for instance, Koop, 2003, which we rely on in our exposition below). 
Subsections 3.4 and 3.5 present our results. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Countries included in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, US, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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3.2 Methodology 
Bayesian estimation is implemented by combining data likelihood with prior information to 
compute the posterior densities (Zellner, 1971). According to this approach all uncertainty 
(about the model, about variables’ selection, and about the unknown parameters) is 
expressed in terms of probability distributions, and relies on few simple rules of the 
probability theory. More precisely, imagine we have a matrix of data Y = [y, x] and a vector 
of parameters θ = [ ,...,.., 21 kθθθ ], and wish to learn about the parameters θ  given the data 
Y. Bayes’ theorem can then be applied, which states that: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )Yp
pYpYp θθθ ×= ||                                              (1) 
where: ( )Yp  is the marginal density of the observations included in Y; ( )θp  is the prior 
density, it summarizes our beliefs upon θ  before analysing the data, Y, and is subjectively 
determined by the researcher; ( )θ|Yp  is the likelihood function which gives the joint data 
density value conditionally to the maximum-likelihood estimate of θ ; finally, the posterior 
density, ( )Yp |θ , combines the latter two pieces of information and expresses our knowledge 
about θ  after looking at the data. The mean of the posterior density may be utilized as a 
point estimate, that is:  
( ) ( ) θθθθ dYpYE kk ∫= ||                                             (2) 
and the posterior standard deviation may be interpreted as a measure of the degree of 
uncertainty of the point estimate, that is: 
θθθθ
θθ
dYpYEwhere
YEYEDevSt
kk
kk
∫=
−=
)|()|(
)]|([)|(..
22
22
                                           (3) 
Yet, except special cases, (2) does not present an analytical derivation. Thus we have to 
resort to sampling algorithms (such as the Gibbs sampling and the Metropolist-Hastings 
algorithm). 
Bayesian model comparison is undertaken by using the posterior odds ratios (Jeffreys, 
1961. See also Gelfand and Dey, 1994; Geweke, 1999; Pettit and Young, 1990). Suppose that 
there exist n plausible theories to explain data Y = [y, x], and that each of them can be 
summarized by a statistical model Mi with i = 1,2....n, which depends on parameters iθ . 
The posterior density, the prior density and the likelihood function turn out now to depend 
on what model is being used. Accordingly (1) becomes:  
),(
),(),|(),|(
i
iiii
ii MYp
MpMYpMYp θθθ ×=                                     (4) 
We are interested in finding out which model is more likely to be given the data Y. By 
Bayes’ theorem, we can also write:  
)()|()()|(
)()|()|(
jjii
ii
i MpMYpMpMYp
MpMYpYMp ×+×
×=  (5) 
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where i≠j, and iiiiii dMpMYpMYp θθθ∫= )|(),|()|(  is called marginal probability of the data 
given Mi. Expression (5) defines the posterior probability that Mi is correct (under the 
assumption that either Mi or Mj is correct, i.e. )|( YMp i + )|( YMp j = 1). An expression 
analogous to (5) can be derived relatively to Mj, )|( YMp j . The ratio between )|( YMp i  
and )|( YMp j gives the posterior odds ratio:  
)(
)(
)|(
)|(
)|(
)|(
j
i
j
i
j
i
ij Mp
Mp
MYp
MYp
YMp
YMpPO ==                                    (6) 
that says to which extent data support Mi relatively to model Mj. The first factor on the 
right hand side of equation (6) is the Bayes’ factor, Bij, while the second factor is the prior 
odds ratio. In the absence of prior beliefs supporting one model against the other, the prior 
odds ratio is equal to one, and the Bayes’ factor coincides with the posterior odds ratio, 
which turns out to be:  
)|(
)|(
j
i
ijij MYp
MYpBPO ==                                               (7) 
If Bij is larger that unity, we can say that model i is more likely than model j in explaining 
Y7. If, on the contrary, Bij is smaller than unity, model Mj is suggested to be more likely 
than Mi. Notice that this should not be interpreted as a decisive proof for the validity of one 
model against another, but rather as a measure of relative support. 
3.3 Model specification and data details 
Given the described methodology, we aim at studying the effect of ownership concentration 
over employment protection allowing for co-determination of the two variables. To elicit 
this purpose we estimate a simultaneous two-equation model, whose general structural form 
may be expressed as follows: 
235142
12312211
εββ
εβββ
++=
+++=
xxy
xxyy
                                            (8) 
where 1y  is an ( 1×N ) vector of observations on the dependent variable of interest, 2y  is an 
( 1×N ) vector of observations on the endogenous variable, 1x , 2x  and 3x  are respectively 
( 1kN × ), ( 2kN × ) and ( 3kN × ) matrixes of exogenous variables, 321 kkkk ++=  being the 
total number of exogenous variables into the system. 1β  is a scalar parameter, while 2β , 
3β , 4β  and 5β  are vectors of parameters. Finally, 1ε  and 2ε  are the ( 1×N )  vectors of 
                                                 
7 Jeffreys (1961) proposes the following rules of thumb for assessing the evidence provided by data: (i) 1 < Bij < 
3.16: the evidence slightly supports Mi. (ii)  3.16 < Bij < 10: the evidence moderately supports Mi. (iii) 10 < Bij 
< 100: the evidence strongly supports Mi. (iv) 100 < Bij: the evidence decisively supports Mi. 
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error terms. Defining [ ]21, yyy = , [ ]321 ,, xxxx = , and [ ]21,εεε = 8, model (8) may also be 
written in compact notation as: 
ε+= xy BΓ                                                        (9) 
where ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=Γ
10
1 1β  and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
54
32
0
0
B ββ
ββ
. Since Γ is an upper triangular matrix (and so is 
its inverse, 1−Γ ), the system may be solved recursively and, providing that 13 ≥k , the 
necessary condition for identification is met. Furthermore, the triangular structure of (9) 
implies that det(Γ) = 1 and, as a consequence, its likelihood function is the same as a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR, hereafter) model. The structural form of the model 
can thus be directly estimated using methods developed for SUR models, settling in this 
way the important prior elicitation and identification issues associated with SEM Bayesian 
estimation (see van Dijk, 2002; Richard and Steel, 1988; Koop, 2003; Koop and Tobias, 
2003; and Koop, Poirer and Tobias, 2004). From (9), the reduced form of model (8) may 
also be written as:  
η+Φ= xy                                                      (10) 
where B1−Γ=Φ  is the (2×k) matrix of parameters, and εη 1−Γ=  is the matrix of error terms. 
We assume x|η  to be i.i.d. ),0( 1 NIHN ⊗− , H being the 2×2 error precision matrix.  
Bayesian inference requires prior information for the unknown parameters Φ  and 1−H , 
that are supposed to be independent. The marginal distribution of Φ  is Normal (N) and 
such that Φ∼ ),( 1−ΦΠ HN , while the marginal distribution of H is Wishart (W) with v  
degrees of freedom and mean equal to 1−Sv , i.e. H ∼ ),( 1 vSW − . 
Endogenous and exogenous variables entering model (8) are suggested by the previous 
literature and explained as follows. The dependent variable in the first equation ( 1y ) is 
Labour (Botero et al., 2004) which is an index between zero and one and measures the 
protection of labour and employment laws including: cost and existence of alternative 
employment contracts, cost of increasing hours worked, cost of firing workers, and dismissal 
procedures. The dependent variable of the second equation ( 2y ), is Concentr (La Porta et 
al., 1999) which represents an ownership concentration index between zero and one and 
measures the “common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non 
financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country” (La Porta et al., 2006: 9). We 
allow ownership concentration to affect labour regulation: Concentr also enters the first 
equation as an explanatory variable (albeit endogenous). A positive sign for the related 
coefficient hints a political reaction of labour to concentrated corporate governance forms in 
terms of stronger protection. On the other hand, where politics was able to anticipate 
economic forces, corporate  governance forms could react to the concentration of labour 
                                                 
8 Furthermore, on the basis of the previous symbology, θ = ],,,..,[ 21521 εε σσβββ . 
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interests and strong unionizations. Thus we include Union density (Botero et al., 2004) as 
an explanatory variable on the ownership concentration equation. This variable is the union 
density rate in 1997 and proxies the degree of workers’ right representation. In the 
robustness checks we estimate the model also using Left (La Porta et al., 2006) in the place 
of Union density. Left is a measure for left power, and corresponds to the percentage of 
years between 1975 and 1995 during which the political orientation of the executive was 
leftist.  
The other explanatory variables used in the system estimation are as follows. Common 
(La Porta et al., 1999) is a dummy variable for Common legal origins. Eff government 
(Kaufman et al.,  2003) is a proxy for government effectiveness in 2000 and takes into 
account the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. It ranges between -2.5 and 
2.5 with higher values standing for higher government effectiveness. Eff judiciary 
(International Country Risk Guide) measures the efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment considering its impact on business. It ranges between 0 and 10 and is 
calculated between 1980 and 1983. Antidir (La Porta et al., 1998) is the index for anti-
director rights and is obtained adding one when: shareholders are allowed to mail their 
proxy vote; shareholders are not required to deposit their shares before the general 
shareholder meeting; cumulative voting or proportional representation of minority 
shareholders is permitted; there exist mechanisms for protection of oppressed minorities; the 
minimum percentage of share capital to call for an extraordinary shareholders meeting is 
less than or equal to ten percent; finally, shareholders are entitled of pre-emptive rights that 
can be waved only by a shareholders meeting. GDP (La Porta et al., 2006) is the logarithm 
of per capita GDP in US dollars in 2000.  Other variables used in the robustness checks are 
reported below. Prop (Pagano and Volpin, 2005) stands for 1986-1990 average 
proportionality, where the proportionality index equals 3 if 100% of the seats are assigned 
by proportional rule, equals 2 if the majority of the seats are assigned by proportional rule, 
1 if the proportional rule applies to the minority of the seats and zero otherwise. Investor 
protection (La Porta et al., 2006) is an index that represents protection of the investor and 
reflects securities laws for financial markets discipline and private litigation (liability 
standards and mandate disclosure) and the antidirector rights. Union index (Botero et al., 
2004) assesses the statutory protection and power of unions and is computed by averaging 
seven dummies for respectively: employees’ unionization right, employees’ collective 
bargaining rights, employees’ legal duty to bargain with unions, collective contracts 
extended to third parties by law, closed shops allowed by law, workers’, or unions’, 
representation in the Boards of Directors, workers’ councils mandatory by law. Relations 
index (Botero et al., 2004) corresponds to a measure of protection of collective relations laws 
and is computed as the average of the index for labour union power and the index for 
protection of workers in collective disputes. Social security index (Botero et al., 2004) is 
obtained as the average of three indexes that gauge the level of benefits for respectively: old 
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age, disability and death, sickness and health, and unemployment. The fact that the 
variables used in the analysis are measured in different reference periods is not an issue here 
since the cross-section variation largely dominates the variation over time.  
In conclusion, the final baseline model can be expressed as follows: 
 
ii
ii
uGDPjudEffUnionAntidirCommonConcentr
uGDPgovEffLeftConcentrCommonLabour
21098762
1543211 ++++++=
++++++=
βββββα
βββββα
           (11) 
In the sensitivity checks we experiment with alternative explanatory variables and further 
controls as explained in sub-section 3.5. Table 1 lists all the variables involved with 
summary statistics. We also report the expected sign relatively to each equation and a 
reference to previous data evidence for the suggested relation. 
Before turning to the estimation results we need to specify our priors that are 
summarized in table 2. PRIOR1 is a diffused one where data evidence dominates the 
posterior outcome. All the parameters are assumed to follow a Normal distribution with 
mean equal to 0 and standard error equal to 5. The regression coefficients are all set at the 
point that corresponds to no effects on the dependent variables, but the large variance 
spreads considerably the density around the prior. This is equivalent to saying that we 
presume ignorance about model parameters. PRIOR2 is more informative since it contains 
prior information provided by the previous literature. In the first equation (Labour), 
coefficients on Common, GDP and Left power are supposed to have prior mean equal to, 
respectively, -0.5 -0.5 and 0.5, and prior standard error equal to 0.5. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Expected sign 
Variable Mean St.Dev. 
Labour Eq. Ownership Eq.
Labour index 0.4574 0.1846 (dependent)  
Concentration 0.4272 0.1385 + (BP05) (dependent) 
Union density 0.2959 0.2233 + (Bot05)   + (Roe03) 
Left power 0.3375 0.2908 + (Bot05) + (LP06) 
Common law 0.3542 0.4833 - (Bot05) - (LP06) 
Eff government 0.8006 1.0192 + (Bot05)  
GDP 8.7558 1.4749 + (Bot05) + (LP06) 
Antidirector rights 3.0000 1.3070  - (LP06) 
Eff  judiciary 7.6665 2.0507  - (LP06) 
Proportionality 0.6473 0.4300 + (PV05) + (PV05) 
Investor protection 0.4711 0.2286  - (LP06) 
Relations index 0.4410 0.1408 (dependent)  
Union index 0.4385     0.2020 (dependent)  
Social sec. index 0.6160     0.1999 (dependent)  
Note: Abbreviations in brackets in columns 4 and 5 stand respectively for: BP05 = Belloc and Pagano 
(2005), Bot05 = Botero et al. (2005), Roe03 = Roe (2003), LP06 = La Porta et al. (2006), PV05 = 
Pagano and Volpin (2005). 
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In the second equation (Ownership concentration), coefficients associated with 
Common and Antidir are both set with prior mean 0.5 and prior standard error 0.5. All the 
other parameters, about which we have no (or inconclusive) prior data evidence, are allowed 
to vary more around the prior means. In particular, in the first equation, Concentr, GDP 
and Eff  gov are expected to have positive effects on the dependent variable (prior mean 
equal to 0.5), but a large variability (prior standard deviation equal to 5). In the second 
equation, the coefficient on Union density has a positive anticipated sign (prior mean equal 
to 0.5), whereas those on GDP and Eff jud are supposed to have a negative impact (prior 
mean equal to -0.5) on Ownership concentration, all with a prior standard deviation equal 
to 5. We also retain strong uncertainty on the constant terms (zero prior mean and prior 
standard errors equal to 5). PRIOR3 restricts the range within which parameters are 
allowed to move and, while maintaining the prior means as specified in PRIOR2, sets prior 
standard error equal to 0.5 for all the coefficients considered, except the constant terms. 
Finally, we always maintain uninformative priors on the relevant parameters for 
H( vS ,1− ) which is assumed to be distributed as a Wishart with 2 degrees of freedom (equal 
to the number of equations) and mean equal to 0 for each element of the matrix, i.e. 
H ∼ ( )2,0 22×W . This choice is motivated by the fact that more informative priors are 
considered too restrictive by the relevant literature (see in particular Dreze and Richard, 
1983). 
 
 Table 2. Priors 
Variable PRIOR1 PRIOR2 PRIOR3 
Labour equation 
Constant Normal (0, 5) Normal (0, 5) Normal (0, 5) 
Common law Normal (0, 5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5)
Concentration Normal (0, 5) Normal (0.5, 5) Normal (0.5, 0.5) 
Left power Normal (0, 5) Normal (0.5, 0.5) Normal (0.5, 0.5) 
Eff government Normal (0, 5) Normal (0.5, 5) Normal (0.5, 0.5) 
GDP  Normal (0, 5) Normal (-0.5, 5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5)
Ownership concentration equation 
Constant Normal (0, 5) Normal (0, 5) Normal (0, 5) 
Common law Normal (0, 5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5)
Antidirector rights Normal (0, 5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5)
Union density Normal (0, 5) Normal (0.5, 5) Normal (0.5, 0.5) 
Eff  judiciary Normal (0, 5) Normal (-0.5, 5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5)
GDP  Normal (0, 5) Normal (-0.5, 5) Normal (-0.5, 0.5)
H ∼ ( )2,0 22×W  
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3.4 Results 
Our two-equation SEM is estimated using the Gibbs sampler (Gelfand and Smith, 1990; 
Tanner, 1993). This is a method for posterior simulation largely adopted in linear regression 
model settings. We take 35,000 replications, with 5,000 burn-in replications discarded and 
the remaining 30,000 retained to compute the posterior features of interest. 
Table 3 presents our estimation output. As one can notice results from respectively 
PRIOR1, PRIOR2 and PRIOR3 are very similar suggesting that data information is 
predominant9. All signs are as expected and, in a frequentist perspective, the posterior 
means of the regression coefficient always fall at least within the 10% confidence level (with 
the only exception of GDP in the Labour equation and of Common laws in the Ownership 
concentration equation).  
With regard to the diagnostics, assessing the accuracy of the numerical approximations 
is essential in order to present reliable results with the Gibbs sampler. Thus, following 
Geweke (1992), we compute numerical standard errors (NSE) for the approximations of 
( )Y|E kθ . The ESˆN  is given by Sg /σˆ , where gσˆ  is the estimated standard error of the 
importance function, )(θg , conditional to Y, and S is the number of replications of the 
Gibbs sampler  (for more details see Geweke, 1992, and Koop, 2003). The obtained ESˆN  
are very small relative to posterior standard deviations of all parameters (not reported for 
reasons of space), so to indicate a high degree of accuracy, in spite of the limited number of 
observations. 
A second diagnostic test suggested by Geweke (1992) is the convergence diagnostic 
(CD). It compares the estimated ( )YE k |θ  based on the first SA replications (after the burn-
in replications) and that based on the last SB replications. If the two estimates turn out 
significantly different it means that not enough replications have being used by the sampler. 
The relevant statistics is given by )()(
BABA SSSS ESˆNESˆN/gˆgˆ +− , where ASgˆ and BSgˆ are the 
estimates of ( )YE k |θ  based on respectively the first SA and the last SB replications, and 
ASESˆN  and BSESˆN  are the correspondent computed numerical standard errors. The CD 
statistics is distributed as a standard Normal. Our results, obtained setting SA = SB = 
10,000, are reported in the fifth, ninth and thirtieth columns of table 3 for respectively 
PRIOR1, PRIOR2 and PRIOR3. As one can notice the values obtained for the CD 
statistics are always smaller than the critical values from the standard Normal statistical 
table. 
 
                                                 
9 Estimated prior and posterior densities relative to PRIOR3 are reported in Appendix. 
Table 3: Posterior results 
 Prior 1 (uninformative) Prior 2 (informative) Prior 3 (informative) 
Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE CD Mean 90% HPDI NSE CD Mean 90% HPDI NSE CD 
Labour equation 
Constant  0.1106 [-0.566, 0.708] 0.0124 -0.6403  0.0944 [-0.591, 0.698]  0.0169  0.2065  0.2410 [-0.293, 0.737] 0.0064 -0.5587 
Common -0.1959 [-0.287, -0.096] 0.0013  0.3941 -0.1957 [-0.287, -0.094]  0.0017  -0.3538 -0.2104 [-0.291, -0.125] 0.0008  0.2453 
Concentration  0.9549 [0.371, 1.627] 0.0139  0.6664  0.9762 [0.379, 1.679]  0.0197  -0.2040  0.8073 [0.354, 1.299] 0.0083  0.3007 
Left power  0.1675 [0.083, 0.252] 0.0003  0.2234  0.1702 [0.087, 0.254]  0.0004   0.7846  0.1698 [0.087, 0.253] 0.0003  0.9164 
GDP -0.0204 [-0.067, 0.029] 0.0006  0.5817 -0.0198 [-0.067, 0.030]  0.0008  -0.1417 -0.0268 [-0.070, 0.018] 0.0003  0.7636 
Gov eff  0.1201 [0.068, 0.173] 0.0003  0.1625  0.1209 [0.068, 0.174]  0.0004  -0.4822  0.1187 [0.066, 0.171] 0.0003  0.0042 
Ownership concentration equation 
Constant  0.9826 [0.841, 1.125] 0.0007 -0.4227 0.9820  [0.838, 1.126]  0.0008  -0.0339  0.9871 [0.845, 1.130] 0.0006  0.6255 
Common -0.0093 [-0.067, 0.049] 0.0004  0.0710 -0.0100 [-0.068, 0.048]  0.0006  0.5575 -0.0049 [-0.061, 0.052] 0.0003 -0.0879 
Antidirectior -0.0355 [-0.054, -0.019] 0.0002  0.3246 -0.0352 [-0.053, -0.018]  0.0003  -0.3583 -0.0375 [-0.055, -0.021] 0.0001  0.4653 
Union dens  0.0913 [0.009, 0.176] 0.0004 -0.4873 0.0905  [0.009, 0.176]  0.0006  0.3478  0.0977 [0.012, 0.186] 0.0004 -0.1978 
GDP -0.0321 [-0.051,-0.013] 0.0001 -0.2792 -0.0322 [-0.052, -0.013]  0.0001  0.0769 -0.0315 [-0.051, -0.012] 0.0001 -0.8272 
Jud eff -0.0202 [-0.032,-0.009] 0.0001  0.7294 -0.0201 [-0.032, -0.009]  0.0001  -0.1349 -0.0211 [-0.033, -0.010] 0.0001 0.1510 
NOTE: Total number of retained replications is 30,000, number of burn-in replications is 5,000. 
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We now turn to model comparison, which is implemented by Bayes factors. First, we 
perform nested model comparison. Accordingly, we compare the full model with an abridged 
model where one coefficient at a time is set to have zero prior mean and zero prior standard 
error. This is equivalent to saying that we constrain the associated variable to have no 
effect on the dependent variable, so challenging the relevance of our informative priors. 
More in detail, we proceed as follows. We compute the posterior log-likelihood of the full 
model (M0), the posterior log-likelihood of the abridged model (M1) and then take the ratio 
between the two: ( ) ( )1001 Y|M/pY|MpB = . B01 > 1 indicates that the full model is more likely 
than the abridged model: thus theory representing model 1 is supported by the evidence. On 
the contrary, B01 < 1 hints that the abridged model is to be preferred to the full model in 
terms of (log-)likelihood maximization, and so the theory considered must be cast aside. As 
a second step we compare theories two-by-two (time by time denoted by respectively 1 and 
2), implementing comparisons of the relevant non-nested models. Assume that M0 denotes 
the full model, M1 the abridged model without the effect suggested by theory 1, and M2 the 
abridged model without the effect proposed by theory 2. We compute the ratio of the two 
Bayes factors between full and abridged models and obtain 
( ) ( )21201021 |/|/ MYpMYpBBB == . If B21 > 1, we can conclude that M2 (model without 
effect for theory 2) is more likely than M1 (model without effect for theory 1), providing 
theory 1 to be more likely than theory 2 in explaining the data.  
Our results are shown in table 4 and are commented below with reference to the rules 
of thumb suggested by Jeffreys (1961) and reported in note 7. With regard to the first 
 
Table 4. Model comparisons 
Nested model comparison Non-nested model comparison 
Models compared 
M0/M1 
PRIOR1 PRIOR2 PRIOR3
Models compared 
M2/M1 
PRIOR1 PRIOR2 PRIOR3
Labour equation 
Full/No Comm 21.0634 25.2075 164.8291  No Comm/No Own 5.5382 2.8628 3.0753
Full/No Conc 116.6543 72.1633 506.8719    
Full/No Left 31.1943 20.3199 97.7594  No Left/No Own 3.7396 3.5514 5.1849
Full/No GDP  0.9463 0.5878 2.3428  No GDP/No Own 123.2741 122.7685 216.3530
Full/No Eff gov 46.1334 26.3798 114.0451  No Eff gov/No Own 2.5286 2.7355 4.4445
Ownership concentration equation 
Full/No Comm 0.9008 3.8122 2.1194  No Comm/No Union 4.0622 4.2971 4.5019
Full/No Antidir 18.6853 104.4061 61.6605  No Antidir/No Union 0.1958 0.1569 0.1547
Full/No Union 3.6592 16.3815 9.5414     
Full/No GDP 2.8962 11.4023 6.3502  No GDP/No Union 1.2634 1.4367 1.5025
Full/No Eff jud  2.7701 12.3943 7.0037  No Eff jud/No Union 1.3210 1.3217 1.3623
NOTE: Total number of retained replications is 30,000, number of burn-in replications is 5,000. 
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equation, all the variables receive support in the data, with the only exception of GDP in 
the first equation. Indeed, in this case the full model is only weakly more likely than the 
corresponding abridged model according to PRIOR3, while it is suggested to be even less 
likely than the abridged model according to PRIOR1 and PRIOR2. More interestingly, 
Common and Ownership concentration present Bayes factor in their favor larger than 150. 
This indicates a decisive support for the associated theories. With regard to the second 
equation, we obtain that all variables find a quite mild support by the econometric output, 
but the Antidirector rights, which is largely preferred than other regressors in explaining 
Ownership concentration (although the correspondent Bayes factor is larger than 100 only 
when PRIOR2 is considered).  
Finally, we perform, non-nested model comparison running “horse-races” between the 
theories considered. Relatively to the first equation we compare the abridged model for each 
theory with the model with no ownership concentration effect. We obtain that the latter is 
always dismissed by the Bayes factor test. The implemented experiment thus indicates that 
the concentration argument is far more influential than other arguments in the 
determination of workers rights. With regard to the ownership concentration equation, 
instead, we compare the various abridged models with the model where the “social 
democracy” effect suggested by Roe (2003) is assumed not to work. We obtain that Roe’s 
argument is preferred by data against other theories but against that sustaining the 
antidirector rights effect that is always indicated to be the best determinant of the cross-
country variation in corporate ownership structures. 
3.5 Robustness checks 
In this section we gauge the robustness of our previous conclusions. Since the three priors 
provide very consistent results, we only report estimation output relative to PRIOR3.  
First, following La Porta et al. (2006), we replace Union density with the proxy for left 
power as regressor in the ownership concentration equation. This variable is to capture the 
negative effect of “social democracy” on corporate ownership dispersion, suggested by Roe 
(2003). We set prior mean and prior standard deviation of Left power both equal to 0.5. 
Results are in table 5.1. As one can notice our qualitative conclusions are unaltered. 
Furthermore, the results for the model comparison (not reported) do not change in any 
relevant way. 
Second, Pagano and Volpin (2005) assess that the proportionality of the electoral 
system positively affect both workers rights’ protection and ownership concentration. 
Accordingly, we include Proportionality as an additional explanatory variable in both 
equations. The existing data evidence (Pagano and Volpin, 2005) on the related parameters 
leads us to set 0.5 as prior mean and 0.5 as prior standard deviation. Results are shown in 
table 5.2. We observe that although the estimated coefficient on Proportionality are positive 
as expected, their posterior estimated values lie outside the 90% confidence interval, that 
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means that, from a standard frequentist perspective, the associated effects would be 
considered not statistically significant. 
Third, it may be argued that the index for antidirector rights representation is 
endogenous. To deal with this objection, we estimate the three-equation SEM that is 
reported below:  
ii
ii
ii
GDPopjudEffCommonAntidir
GDPjudEffUnionAntidirConcentr
GDPopgovEffLeftConcentrCommonLabour
3141312113
2109872
16543211
Pr
Pr
εββββα
εββββα
εββββββα
+++++=
+++++=
+++++++=
      (12) 
For the model specification we follow La Porta et al. (2006) that use Common as an 
instrument for Antidirector (investor protection) excluded from the ownership concentration 
equation (notice also that this variable weakly enters the second equation in our basic model 
estimation). Furthermore we also include the index for proportionality of the electoral 
system in the first and third equations. Indeed, this specification better represents the effect 
proposed by Pagano and Volpin (2005) that focus on the simultaneous determination of 
labour protection and investor protection (not of ownership concentration). Previous 
evidence (La Porta et al., 1999; Pagano and Volpin, 2005) suggests the following 
informative priors for the Antidirector equation (mean, standard deviation):  Common (0.5, 
0.5); Eff jud (0.5, 0.5); Prop (-0.5, 0.5); GDP (0.5, 0.5). Econometric results are in table 5.3. 
Posterior estimates are consistent with expectations, and do not alter our previous 
qualitative conclusions. 
Forth, the index for antidirector rights is replaced with the investor protection index, 
that is supposed to have the same prior quantities for the relevant parameters. Again our 
conclusions are corroborated. 
Finally, we check for the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the labour protection 
index as measure of workers’ rights protection. Botero et al. (2004) provide several measures 
for such a variable and namely: the Relation index, the Union index, and the Social security 
index. We estimate our SEMs adopting alternatively the three indexes as dependent 
variable in the first equation (output not reported). Again, we are not led to question our 
conclusions, since results are qualitatively consistent with the basic estimation. 
Table 5.1: Robustness checks — Left power 
Labour equation Ownership concentration equation 
Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE 
Constant  0.3086 [-0.2043, 0.7922] 0.0066 Constant  0.9311 [0.7906, 1.0716] 0.0006 
Common -0.2090 [-0.2899,-0.1230] 0.0009 Common -0.0085 [-0.0651, 0.0481] 0.0003 
Concentr  0.7617 [0.3117, 1.2495] 0.0082 Antidir -0.0420 [-0.0593,-0.0256] 0.0001 
Left power  0.1160 [0.0019, 0.2268] 0.0008 Left power  0.0843 [0.0105, 0.1576] 0.0003 
GDP -0.0302 [-0.0729, 0.0137] 0.0003 GDP -0.0245 [-0.0436, 0.0053] 0.0001 
Eff  gov  0.1207 [0.0671, 0.1744] 0.0003 Eff  jud -0.0198 [-0.0314,-0.0084] 0.0001 
    
   Table 5.2: Robustness checks — Proportionality  
Labour equation Ownership concentration equation 
Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE 
Constant  0.4102 [-0.1298, 0.9142] 0.0070 Constant  0.9837 [0.8414, 1.1264] 0.0006 
Common -0.1945 [-0.2751, 0.1093] 0.0007 Common  0.0020 [-0.0570, 0.0613] 0.0003 
Concentr  0.7480 [0.2911, 1.2420] 0.0085 Antidir -0.0365 [-0.0542,-0.0199] 0.0001 
Left power  0.1468 [0.0660, 0.2283] 0.0003 Union dens  0.0768 [-0.0121, 0.1663] 0.0005 
GDP -0.0504 [-0.0969,-0.0024] 0.0004 GDP -0.0334 [-0.0536,-0.0131] 0.0001 
Eff gov  0.1416 [0.0894, 0.1943] 0.0003 Eff  jud -0.0209 [-0.0328,-0.0093] 0.0001 
Prop  0.0756 [-0.0192, 0.1661] 0.0001 Prop  0.0295 [-0.0307, 0.0904] 0.0003 
    
   Table 5.3: Robustness checks — Endogenous antidirector      
Labour equation Ownership concentration equation Antidir. equation 
Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE Coefficient Mean 90% HPDI NSE 
Constant -0.1878 [-0.8739, 0.4651] 0.0150 Constant  1.0044 [0.8585, 1.1508] 0.0011 Constant 0.4915 [-0.2493, 1.2293] 0.0021 
Common -0.1718 [-0.2569,-0.0821] 0.0016 Antidir -0.0496 [-0.0826, -0.0166] 0.0005 Common 1.2872 [0.8554, 1.7173] 0.0026 
Concentrat  0.6528 [0.0104, 1.3271] 0.0152 Union dens  0.0820 [-0.0124, 0.1756] 0.0005 Prop -0.5694 [-1.0315,-0.1092] 0.0026 
Left power  0.1482 [0.0589, 0.2382] 0.0004 Eff jud -0.0152 [-0.0287, -0.0018] 0.0001 Eff jud  0.01112 [-0.1259, 0.1495] 0.0006 
GDP  0.0367 [-0.0063, 0.0826] 0.0009 GDP -0.0342 [-0.0528, -0.0155] 0.0001 GDP 0.2606 [-0.1085, 0.4159] 0.0006 
Prop  0.0505 [-0.0276, 0.1278] 0.0007         
NOTE: Total number of retained replications is 30,000, number of burn-in replications is 5,000. 
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4. Conclusions 
According to some political views, the introduction of corporate legislation similar to that of 
the US has the advantage to anticipate an inevitable global prevalence of the American 
model of corporate governance.  The prevailing literature has many explicit or implicit 
suggestions on the obstacles that should be removed to achieve this result. Some of the 
policy implications stemming from the current work on comparative corporate governance 
examined in this paper are: the introduction of better minority shareholder protection 
(typical of the systems of common law), the reform of electoral systems favouring political 
electoral results (supporting shareholder democracy) and the removal of protective labour 
legislation  (inducing expropriation fears of absentee share holders). 
Our analysis does not have such straightforward policy implications. 
In our view, American populism (keep capitalistic dynasties under control!) and 
European social democracy (create workers' counter-power to powerful capitalist families!) 
have been two very different political strategies by which the various societies have made 
the concentration of power associated to large-scale production compatible with democracy 
and safeguarded the human capital investment of non-owners. Clearly, policy must here be 
interpreted as something broader than economic policy. Restricting the argument may well 
hide the fact that the suggested economic policies may have undesirable consequences for 
political democracy. 
In terms of a narrower concept of economic efficiency, each form of business 
organization requires many complementary institutions. For this reason, disequilibrium 
situations, such as those encountered by Britain in the transition from one politics-business 
co-evolution path to another, are likely to be particularly painful. Once a particular set of 
business institutions is established, a country may often find a path to the accumulation of 
human and material capital that fits better these institutions. The complementarities among 
political power relations, business institutions and economic resources may make changes 
very difficult, even when they would go in the direction of more promising development 
paths. Moreover, in a globally integrated economic environment, each country may 
specialize in those sectors where it enjoys a comparative institutional advantage and extend 
the economic role of its specific institutions. Such productive and institutional specialization 
may make change even more difficult. 
While our approach does not give strong support to any one of the solutions advanced 
in the literature, it is consistent with the possibility that, if the potential complementarities 
are taken into account, some combination of coherent policies may be beneficial. By 
contrast, one-sided measures, which import only one characteristic of a particular system of 
corporate governance, may decrease economic efficiency pushing the system towards a 
fitness valley of inconsistent attributes. And they may even upset the country-specific 
balance between economic power and political democracy.  
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Appendix: Estimated prior and posterior densities – Prior3 
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